empirical work on subnational economic voting remains divided. Whereas some scholars suggest that subnational electoral outcomes reflect swings in the national economy and/or the popularity of the central government, others contend that voters take subnational-level economic performance into account when casting their ballots for subnational offices.
Along the same line, it is not clear whether it is the national or the provincial economy that matters in the Canadian federal context. While some aggregate-level studies link federal election results to national macroeconomic conditions, others present evidence of federal economic voting using provincial economic measures. What is more, nearly no study so far has attempted to determine the extent to which economic conditions might affect provincial election outcomes in Canada.
The purpose of this paper is to address these issues by testing and comparing models of economic voting for Canadian federal and provincial elections in the period . The current analysis uses aggregate-level electoral outcomes and macroeconomic data to estimate the effect of macroeconomic conditions on the federal and provincial incumbent vote. Our analysis thus offers a systematic test to help determine whether Canadian incumbents at the two levels are affected mostly by national or provincial economic conditions.
Whether the electoral success of provincial and federal politicians is affected by economic conditions offers us insight into general patterns of electoral accountability.
Whether it is affected by provincial or national economic conditions is central to our understanding of accountability schemes in federal systems. In such political regimes, the distribution of economic resources is often at the center of disputes among the subnational units and between the different levels of government. While each subnational unit wants to increase its share of the pie, the central government is often resilient to let go its spending power. Drawing upon the theory of economic voting, one would believe that with more spending power, each level of government can improve its policy delivery and hence, create more favorable economic conditions that increase its chances of getting re-elected. Whether this is the case or not remains open to debate.
Theoretical Framework
Are federal incumbents punished for national and/or provincial economic performance? And, are provincial incumbents held accountable for the state of the provincial and/or national economy? To address these questions, we develop a model of economic voting that draws upon the expectations of the extant literature.
The theoretical basis for the model is straightforward. In Canada, as in other countries, inflation, unemployment and disposable income are believed to play a central role in shaping the electoral performance of incumbents. Because inflation has a direct effect on the purchasing power of individuals, it is expected to have a negative impact on the vote. Hence, the incumbent party should be hurt by higher levels of inflation. Because voters feel threatened by the possibility of being unemployed and thus losing their source of income, higher rates of unemployment should also be hurtful to the incumbent party. Likewise, it is also expected that as disposable income increases, the incumbent government is rewarded by the electorate.
Prior work on aggregate vote functions for Canada has broadly confirmed the effect of these macroeconomic factors on incumbency vote in federal elections (see Bélanger and Gélineau 2004; Carmichael 1990; Happy 1986; Nadeau and Blais 1993; 1995) .
However, a central question is left unanswered by those studies and has to do with the target of economic voting. It is not clear whether federal electoral outcomes are a function of national rather than provincial economic performance. Carmichael (1990) , Nadeau and Blais (1993; 1995) as well as Bélanger and Gélineau (2004) only introduce measures of the national economy in their vote functions, while Happy (1986; uses indicators of the provincial economy in his models. Yet, none of these studies compares the relative impact of national and provincial economic conditions on the federal vote, thus leaving this issue entirely unresolved.
Entangling this issue is crucial because attribution of responsibility for national and provincial economic performance is an important factor that might affect the basic relationship between the economy and the vote in federal regimes. The division of powers in the Canadian federal system is such that the federal government is responsible for questions of national prosperity whereas provincial governments are responsible for local economic issues (Mallory 1971; Black 1975; Smiley 1987) . In theory, the federal government should be held accountable for national economic performance, but not necessarily for provincial economic conditions. Nonetheless, many federal policy programs, while striving for national economic prosperity, focus on specific regions or provinces as they aim at reducing disparities in regional economies (Sitwell and Seifried 1984; Savoie 1992) . For this reason, and as Cutler (2002) recently argued, the local impact of federal economic policies may also have a substantial effect on federal voting behavior.
A second, and related, question that is left unanswered in the literature is the extent to which the Canadian electorate holds provincial incumbents accountable for macroeconomic conditions. The sole study of provincial economic voting in Canada is by Crête and Simard (1984) . Analyzing Quebec provincial electoral outcomes between 1931 and 1981, they concluded that incumbent support was significantly affected by provincial real disposable income. Their results also suggested that the economic situation has a stronger effect on provincial than on federal election outcomes in Quebec, despite the fact that the federal government is the prime manager of the economy.
Most of the extant literature on the economic determinants of subnational electoral outcomes has studied the U.S. case and has been marked by a certain level of confusion. Some scholars suggest that state electoral outcomes reflect swings in the national economy and/or presidential popularity (Peltzman 1987; Holbrook-Provow 1987; Piereson 1975; Chubb 1988; Simon, Ostrom, and Marra 1991) . For example, Holbrook-Provow (1987: p. 481) finds that "despite the fact that American governors are not national policymakers, gubernatorial elections are not insulated from the national political and economic climate." Accordingly, "when the sitting president is unpopular, or when the economy is in a slump, the incumbent party will suffer great losses of power in the American states" (p. 481). Others contend that voters take state-level economic performance into account when casting their ballots for subnational officials (Atkeson and Partin 1995; Partin 1995; Lowry, Alt, and Ferree 1998) . Lowry et al. (1998: p. 771 ) find that voters "expect governors to carry out Democratic and Republican budgets as appropriate, and they penalize the governor's party in the legislature if the budget is mismanaged."
The model we propose in this paper assesses the relative impact of national and provincial economic conditions on federal and provincial election outcomes in an attempt to shed light on those issues. Because of the federal division of powers, we expect federal incumbency voting in a province to be more affected by the general state of the national economy than by the particular economic circumstances within that province. For the same theoretical reason, we expect incumbent voting in provincial elections to be affected by the province's economic situation. And, based on the referendum voting argument, we also expect provincial election outcomes to be affected by national economic conditions when the party seeking re-election at the provincial level is of the same family as the party in office at the federal level.
Data and Methodology
Our data analysis is based on a pooled cross-sectional time-series design. The analysis is performed using two separate datasets for more degrees of freedom in the model estimation. In addition, it allows us to evaluate the extent to which the provincial economic performance has an effect on the federal incumbent vote in each province. Federal election data were obtained from Elections Canada, whereas provincial election data were compiled from Feigert (1989) , the Canadian Parliamentary Guide, and the Reports of the Chief Electoral Officer from each province.
The independent variables are aggregate measures of inter-election economic performance at the national and provincial levels. As in previous studies, we look at the three most conventional economic indicators: unemployment (seasonally adjusted percentage), annual percentage change in the consumer price index, and annual percentage change in real personal disposable income per capita. Since quarterly or monthly time-series national data for these three indicators are available on a systematic basis only for the post-1960s period, we decided to rely on annual data. In doing so, we can extend our analysis as far back as the early 1950s. Each macroeconomic indicator was weighted for the month in which the specific federal or provincial election occurred.
1 The time horizon is the year prior to the election. All economic data were obtained from Statistics Canada.
The statistical analysis relies upon ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with robust standard errors, using the Huber-White sandwich estimator of variance to address potential problems of heteroskedasticity. Because of the cross-sectional nature of the dataset, residuals cannot be assumed to be independent across provinces. For this reason, a cluster specification of the error term identifying the province to which each observation belongs is introduced in each estimation. Note that separate analyses for federal and provincial elections are performed, so that the determinants of electoral outcomes can easily be compared between the two levels of government.
In addition to the macroeconomic indicators, all our federal and provincial vote models include two control variables. First, a lag of the dependent variable is included on the righthand side of the equations as a proxy for party identification and as a control for aggregate vote stability between elections. Second, a variable is introduced to control for the length of mandate. The variable is the logarithmic transformation of the actual number of months the incumbent party spent in government since the last election. It is expected that the coefficient associated with this variable be negative, as shorter governments usually perform better during subsequent elections. Short-lived governments are usually minority governments. 2 The electorate may thus be risk-averse and use the subsequent election as a means to grant majority to a minority government (Strom 1990; Powell and Whitten 1993; Whitten and Palmer 1999) . The logarithmic transformation of the variable introduces the assumption that the marginal effect of time diminishes as mandates grow longer.
Two additional controls are included in the federal vote models. First, we introduce variables that control for the presence of strong regional parties in recent federal elections. Not only do these parties reduce the incumbent party's vote share by their mere presence on the ballot, but they also tend to inhibit the expression of an economic vote by appealing to voters on the basis of non-economic issues or grievances (Godbout and Bélanger 2002 
Results
Our analysis is performed in two stages. We begin by estimating the effect of the economy on electoral outcomes at the federal level. We then move on to analyzing the nature and extent of economic voting in provincial elections. Completing our analysis in this fashion allows us to assess the impact of national and/or provincial economic conditions on the vote by comparing elections at the two levels of government. Nadeau and Blais's (1993; 1995) prior work, we find that a one point increase in the national unemployment rate translates into a loss of nearly two points in the federal incumbent's share of the vote (columns 1 and 4). The impact of national inflation appears substantial as well, with a one percentage point increase in inflation resulting in a little less than half a point loss in incumbent support in federal elections (column 2). The effect of inflation, however, is no longer significant when the variable is included along with unemployment and income growth in the same equation (column 4).
Curiously, national disposable income appears to have a significant negative effect when entered with unemployment and inflation (column 4). This finding is counterintuitive, but not surprising given that unemployment and income are closely correlated (Pearson's R = -.54).
This phenomenon is probably a product of Okun's law which states that increases in unemployment always induce losses of income growth (see Hibbs 1987) . Thus, this preliminary model of federal economic voting indicates that, in general, unemployment and, to a lesser extent, inflation seem to matter to federal election outcomes in Canada.
In order to verify whether provincial economic performance has any effect on the federal vote, we compare the effect of the national measures of the economy with that of provincial measures. Table 3 are virtually identical to those presented in Table 1 , with the exception that the magnitude of the coefficients is smaller in the provincial economy models.
As expected, provincial unemployment and inflation both have a significant impact on the vote share of the federal incumbent. But, as with national economic measures, unemployment seems to exert the single most influence on the vote (column 4, Table 3 ). Note that the total sample size drops to 151 in columns 2 thru 4 of Further indication that national economics seem to matter more to federal election outcomes than provincial economic conditions comes from Table 4 . Results presented in this model suggest that when including both provincial and national unemployment into the same equation, the significant effect of provincial unemployment found in Table 3 disappears.   3 What is more, the inclusion of both provincial and national unemployment measures in the equation does not substantially affect the significant impact of the national unemployment rate on federal incumbency voting (compared to results found in Table 1 ), thus leading us to believe that national economic performance has a stronger effect on the federal vote than provincial performance.
[
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
In order to explore the effect of economic conditions on the electoral success of provincial incumbents, we adopt the same strategy as in Table 1 , whereas we introduce each provincial macroeconomic indicator individually to assess the separate effect of unemployment, inflation, and real disposable income on the vote. The fourth model incorporates the three indicators simultaneously. The results shown in Table 5 suggest that provincial economics have no statistically significant effect on the vote for provincial incumbents. Note that six elections are lost from the sample in colums 2 thru 4, due again to the unavailability of some macroeconomic measures for PEI.
[ TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
To assess the possibility that voters refer to the national economy when evaluating their provincial incumbent, we replace the provincial economic data by the national-level measures used in Table 1 . Interestingly, Table 6 suggests that both national unemployment and national income have a significant effect on provincial incumbent vote. Both variables affect provincial election outcomes in the expected direction. Also interesting is the fact that the two indicators appear significant when included separately in the analysis, but not when introduced jointly, which appears to confirm the existence of an inverse relationship between unemployment and income levels, as was already observed in Table 1.   [TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
The remaining question, then, is whether these surprising provincial findings reflect a real pattern of referendum voting or simply result from a spurious relationship in the data. In other words, are provincial incumbents really evaluated on the basis of the national economic performance? In order to test this possibility, we split the sample into those provincial incumbents who are of the same partisan family as the incumbent federal government (hereafter identified as "in-party" incumbents) and provincial incumbents from opposition parties at the federal level. If provincial voting patterns reflect a referendum on the federal incumbent, we should find that national economic deterioration is associated with a loss of votes in in-party provinces, and with a gain of votes in provinces controlled by the opposition.
Or at the very least, we should find strong evidence of economic voting in in-party provinces, but not in provinces controlled by opposition parties. The results presented in Table 7 are supportive of the weakest form of referendum voting. Both national unemployment and income are significantly related to provincial incumbent vote in in-party provinces but not in provinces controlled by the opposition.
[ TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
A word about the control variables included in our models is in order before we conclude. One can notice that their effects are always statistically significant and in the expected direction throughout the tables. The vote share received in the previous election is a good predictor of the vote an incumbent party receives when seeking reelection, suggesting some stability of the vote at the aggregate level both in federal and provincial elections. Also, the longer the mandate, the less votes the incumbent party is likely to get. This effect implies that minority governments in Canada are usually re-elected as majority governments and that the longer a government waits to call an election, the more his popularity is affected by the "cost of ruling" (see Paldam 1986) . Finally, the presence of strong regional parties negatively affects federal incumbent voting, and Liberal incumbents at the federal level are likely to receive a larger share of the vote than Conservative incumbents.
Conclusion
The analysis presented in this paper sought to determine whether economics matter to the vote in Canadian federal elections and whether provincial or national performance matters most. It also aimed at assessing whether Canadian provincial election outcomes were also determined by economic conditions, and whether provincial or national conditions matter most. In doing so, the paper addressed the larger debate about the peculiarities of electoral accountability in a federal context.
Our analysis first showed that provincial economic conditions only have a limited impact on the federal vote in Canada. More precisely, the results suggested that provincial economics did not have much of an independent effect on federal electoral outcomes.
Canadians seem to hold the federal incumbent responsible for national economic conditions, more so than for provincial conditions. As a result, it seems that federal incumbents do not gain much votes by claiming credit for the economic prosperity of any particular province when, on average, national economic conditions are deteriorating.
Second, we demonstrated that provincial incumbents are held accountable for the national economic performance, but not for provincial performance. More precisely, the analysis allowed us to conclude that economic voting in the Canadian provinces seems to function as a referendum on the federal government. Accordingly, provincial governments formed by the Liberal or Conservative parties appear to be affected by the state of the national economy when their party is also in power at the federal level. By contrast, provincial governments formed by the NDP, the Social Credit or the Parti Québécois appear shielded from voter dissatisfaction with the federal government's handling of the national economy. 
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